I. INTRODUCTION
According to recent reports in the financial press, an increasing number of firms include 'pro forma' earnings along with net income figures in their earnings releases. 1 Unlike net income, which is defined under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), pro forma earnings numbers are defined by individual firms. In this paper, we examine two questions related to pro forma earnings disclosures: (1) what characteristics distinguish firms that include pro forma earnings in their earnings press releases from those that do not, and (2) does the usefulness of pro forma earnings to investors and its ability to predict future performance vary systematically with these firm characteristics?
This research is important because pro forma earnings releases have been criticized by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), investor relation groups, and others as potentially misleading to investors. For example, in an "Investor Alert" issued on December 4, 2001, the SEC warned investors that pro forma financials "might create a confusing or misleading impression and should be viewed with appropriate and healthy skepticism."
The firms issuing pro forma earnings figures in their press releases take a different view, however, arguing that pro forma results give a clearer picture of the firm's performance and represent an attempt to provide more useful information to investors. Recent empirical evidence (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and Sivakumar, 2001; Bhattacharya et al. 2002) has mainly been directed toward resolving this debate and shows that, on average, pro forma earnings have significant incremental explanatory power for returns beyond that contained in either GAAP operating earnings or GAAP net income. However, prior research has not addressed the broader question of what motivates firms to release pro forma earnings. It is this void in the literature on pro forma earnings that this study seeks to address.
Drawing on previous theoretical and empirical findings, we hypothesize that firms with lower quality GAAP earnings are more likely to include pro forma earnings estimates in their press releases than other firms. Lang and Lundholm (1993) , for example, find that analyst ratings of firms' disclosure practices are negatively related to the correlation between earnings and returns. Tasker (1998) relates low accounting quality to the likelihood of a firm holding a quarterly conference call, and Chen et al. (2002) find that earnings quality proxies are negatively related to the likelihood of voluntary disclosure of balance sheet information in press releases. Therefore, we expect that firms with less informative GAAP earnings are more likely to include pro forma earnings information in their quarterly earnings releases than other firms.
We also predict that firms that miss an earnings benchmark based on GAAP earnings are more likely to provide pro forma earnings information in their press releases.
This prediction follows from Schrand and Walther (2000) , who find that strategic disclosure behavior is more likely to occur when it prevents a negative earnings surprise.
Our sample consists of 249 quarterly press releases from 1997-99 that include a pro forma earnings number. To examine the determinants of pro forma reporting, we use a matched-sample design in which each pro forma firm is matched to a control firm based on 4 -digit industry codes and firm size. We then use a multivariate probit analysis to examine whether earnings quality and strategic considerations are significant determinants of pro forma reporting behavior.
We use the correlation between earnings and returns and its related explanatory power as our primary measures o f earnings quality but also examine a number of additional measures of earnings quality, including intangible intensity, the frequency of accounting losses, market-to-book and debt-to-equity ratios, sales growth, earnings variability, and the proportion of special items to net income. Consistent with our predictions, we find that firms whose managers choose to report pro forma earnings are characterized by a smaller earnings-returns correlation and its related explanatory power, greater sales growth, and greater earnings variability than other firms. We also report weak evidence that the incidence of losses and debt-equity ratios are larger for these firms. These findings support our hypothesis that firms with lower GAAP earnings quality are more likely to r elease pro forma earnings information than other firms. As predicted, we also find that firms with negative earnings surprises are more likely to release pro forma earnings information, which suggests that strategic considerations are an important determinant of the pro forma reporting decision for some firms.
We then examine whether the relative and incremental information content of pro forma earnings to investors varies systematically with GAAP earnings quality and strategic considerations. We find that pro forma earnings figures have significantly greater relative and incremental information content when GAAP earnings quality is low and when earnings surprises are positive. One possible interpretation of these findings is that investors view pro forma disclosures as enhancing the informational environment, rather than obfuscating it, in these instances. To determine whether this view is justified ex post, we also examine the ability of pro forma earnings to predict future operating performance and returns. Consistent with market efficiency, we find that pro forma earnings also have the most predictive power for future earnings and returns in these cases. These findings collectively suggest that managers are motivated by a desire to provide useful information to investors in these instances; however, we cannot definitively rule out an underlying intent to mislead in these cases, nor can we conclude that managers are motivated to obfuscate performance in other instances.
Our results contribute to the accounting literature in several ways. First, the paper explores the determinants of the pro forma reporting decision, thereby contributing to the literatures on both voluntary and strategic disclosure. We also extend current findings on the informativeness of pro forma disclosures by examining whether the information content of pro forma earnings varies cross-sectionally with firm characteristics. Lastly, our findings contribute to the literature on managerial discretion. This paper is organized as follows. We review prior literature in Section II and develop our hypotheses in Section III. We describe our sample selection criteria in Section IV. Sections V and VI present main results and additional tests, respectively, and Section VII concludes.
II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Prior literature on pro forma earnings has concentrated on whether this alternative earnings measure conveys new information to market participants without examining the determinants of the pro forma reporting decision. For example, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) report that analyst tracking services are increasingly focused on definitions of earnings that exclude nonrecurring and noncash items. They provide evidence that stock prices act as if investors price these earnings numbers rather than the numbers reported under GAAP. Similarly, Brown and Sivakumar (2001) find that a pro forma operating income proxy has greater information content than either EPS from operations or EPS before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. Bhattacharya et al. (2002) also report evidence that investors view pro forma earnings as more informative than GAAP earnings. On the other hand, Johnson and Schwartz (2001) find no evidence that pro forma firms benefit from a stock price premium around the release date of pro forma earnings, and Doyle et al. (2002) find that high levels of exclusions of expenses from pro forma earnings lead to predictably lower future cash flows. In related work, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000) show that differences across and intertemporal changes in forecast data providers' definitions of earnings can have a significant impact on the inferences drawn from empirical studies based on this data. Lastly, Bagnoli et al. (2001) document that firms that have successfully influenced the earnings measure that their analysts forecast also have greater incentive and greater ability to manage their earnings surprises.
This study differs from prior work in several key respects. First and most importantly, with the exception of Johnson and Schwartz (2001) and Bhattacharya et al. (2002) , the studies discussed above rely upon commercial databases to obtain their sample firms and earnings measures. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) , Brown and Sivakumar (2001) , and Doyle et al. (2002) all use I/B/E/S data as their source of 'Street' or 'pro forma' operating income. Thus, in these studies, all firms included in the I/B/E/S database become de facto reporters of pro forma earnings, regardless of whether any such designation was made by the firm itself. In contrast, this study includes in its sample only firms that have specifically provided a pro forma earnings figure in their press releases. While this selection criterion results in a significantly smaller sample, it allows us to explore the determinants of t he decision to release pro forma earnings in a way that prior work could not.
The samples examined by Johnson and Schwartz (2001) and Bhattacharya et al. (2002) , however, are closer in composition to our sample firms. Johnson and Schwartz (2001) examine firms that included pro forma or cash earnings in their earnings press releases over a three-month period in 2000, and Bhattacharya et al. (2002) examine press release data over a three-year period, from 1998 to 2000. Our sample is also based on press release data, and our sample period, from 1997 to 1999, partially overlaps with that of Bhattacharya et al. (2002) . Our analyses differ from both studies in several ways. First, we develop and test hypotheses regarding the determinants of the pro forma reporting decision while Johnson and Schwartz (2001) and Bhattacharya et al. (2002) focus mainly on the market reaction to pro forma earnings news. In addition, Johnson and Schwartz (2001) use both market-multiples and short-window returns to examine market reactions while, similar to Bhattacharya et al. (2002) , we perform tests of relative and incremental information content. However, our tests of information content are conditioned on the quality of GAAP earnings and strategic reporting considerations, while Bhattacharya et al. (2002) examine the overall informativeness of pro forma earnings, as well as the informativeness of specific exclusions from pro forma earnings. Our results thus complement and extend recent findings in the growing literature on pro forma reporting.
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
In developing our hypotheses regarding the determinants of the pro forma reporting decision and its usefulness to investors, we view the inclusion of pro forma earnings in a press release as an additional disclosure because not all firms bother to calculate and highlight this figure along with their earnings news. Yet, for many firms, it may be argued that the presentation of pro forma earnings does not constitute new information because the pro forma amount could be obtained by using other information already in the press release.
However, prior research on the effects of recognition versus disclosure suggests that the manner in which financial information is presented has significant pricing implications. For example, in an experimental setting designed to mimic the informational differences between footnote disclosure and explicit recognition of an expense, Bloomfield and Libby (1996) show that markets react more strongly to widely available information than to signals that are available to fewer investors. Davis-Friday et al. (1999) provide empirical evidence that the recognition of post-retirement benefit liabilities in a firm's financial statements receives more weight in market value association tests than does a footnote disclosure of these liabilities, though market efficiency predicts no difference. Aboody (1996) reports similar findings for oil and gas disclosures. In addition, related experimental work on supplemental disclosures by Dietrich et al. (2001) shows that when information that can be inferred from the balance sheet and income statement is 'repackaged' and displayed explicitly, market prices better reflect that information. Thus, while pro forma earnings may represent a mere 'repackaging' of already available information, the disclosure of this alternative earnings measure may indeed affect prices, as the findings of Bradshaw and Sloan (2002), Brown and Sivakumar (2001) , and Bhattacharya et al. (2002) demonstrate.
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Determinants of the Pro Forma Reporting Decision
Prior research (Verrecchia 1983; Verrecchia 1990; and Dye 1985) has shown that full voluntary disclosure of private accounting information will not always occur. Verrecchia (1983) demonstrates that proprietary costs may preclude a firm f rom voluntarily disclosing relevant information because when the costs are sufficiently large, they may exceed the benefits to shareholders. Because pro forma net income typically excludes charges that have already been recognized under GAAP, we believe that any proprietary costs associated with providing pro forma figures are low and thus should not be a major factor in the disclosure decision.
However, as noted by Dye (1985) , nonproprietary information is not always disclosed. He argues that managers have greater incentive to voluntarily disclose nonproprietary information when the information is value-relevant to investors. On a related note, Verrecchia (1990) shows that an increase in the quality of private information results in greater disclosure. Thus, if publicly available information is of poor quality, managers have greater incentive to disclose higher-quality, value-relevant nonproprietary information. Consistent with this view, Chen et al. (2002) provide evidence that firms with relatively less i nformative reported earnings are more likely than other firms to provide voluntary balance sheet disclosures. Similarly, Tasker (1998) finds that firms with low accounting quality are more likely to hold quarterly conference calls.
We therefore expect firm managers to include pro forma net income in an earnings release when they believe that GAAP net income is relatively less informative or of lower quality than a pro forma figure of their own devising. This leads us to our first hypothesis:
H 1 : Firms with low quality GAAP earnings are more likely to engage in pro forma reporting of earnings than other firms.
In testing H 1 , we use both direct and indirect measures of earnings quality. Our first direct measure of earnings quality is the correlation between firms' earnings and returns. As noted by Lo and Lys (2000) , this is a commonly used measure of earnings quality (see Lang and Lundholm 1993; Tasker 1998; or Fan and Wong 2002) . For each sample and control firm, we regress quarterly market-adjusted returns, measured from two days after the previous quarter's earnings announcement date through the current quarter's earnings announcement date (ABRET), on changes in quarterly net income before extraordinary items divided by market capitalization as of the end of the current quarter (∆EARN), as follows:
We require at least eight quarters of complete data for each sample and control firm. To help ensure that the release of pro forma figures is not affecting our measure of earnings quality, we collect the data to estimate equation 1 prior to each firm's first appearance in our sample. For example, if a firm first appears in our sample in the third quarter of 1998, we use data to estimate the firm's earnings-return correlation up through the second quarter of 1998. 3 The estimated coefficient on ∆EARN is our first measure of earnings quality, which we hereafter refer to as EQ1. Our second measure, the R 2 from equation 1, is termed EQ2.
We also include additional indirect measures of earnings quality, which we identify from settings that have been shown to be associated with low quality of earnings, as follows:
High-Technology Firms and Intangible Intensity
Prior research (Francis and Schipper 1999; Lev and Zarowin 1999; Collins et al. 1997 ) has demonstrated that earnings tend to be less informative for high-technology firms because these firms invest heavily in intangibles such as research and development, which may distort GAAP earnings. These firms may benefit from the disclosure of a pro forma earnings figure that emphasizes the effects that these investments have on bottom line earnings. For example, these firms might choose to eliminate in-process R&D charges or amortization of goodwill in order to present a more economically meaningful earnings number. We therefore expect that high-technology firms and firms with a high proportion of intangible assets are more likely to engage in pro forma reporting of income than other firms. We use Francis and Schipper's (1999) classification scheme for hightechnology industries and Collins et al.'s (1997) categorization of intangible-intensive industries. We also measure intangible intensity by dividing intangible assets by total assets at the end of the fiscal year. Hayn ( 1995) and Collins et al. (1997) show that because shareholders have a liquidation option, losses are not expected to perpetuate and are therefore less informative than profits about the firm's future prospects. Loss firms may benefit from reporting pro forma figures that demonstrate the effect of nonrecurring expenses on earnings; that is, if the loss resulted because of unusual charges during the current accounting period, the presentation of a profitable recurring earnings number or a smaller loss figure would draw investors' attention to this fact. We thus expect that firms reporting net losses are more likely to release pro forma net income information than firms experiencing profits.
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Losses
Growth Firms
The value of rapidly expanding firms is relatively m ore difficult to assess based on historical earnings alone; their value is likely more a function of intangible "growth options" (Myers 1977 ) than on past accounting performance. This may be especially true of firms that have substantial start-up costs or a growth strategy that depends heavily upon merger and acquisition activity, as these charges may render GAAP earnings even less value relevant. Consistent with this notion, Lev and Zarowin (1999) report evidence that in fast-changing sectors of the economy, the usefulness of financial reports to corporate acquirers is significantly lower than it is in stable sectors. Growth firms may therefore benefit from reporting a pro forma earnings figure that eliminates these expenses from bottom line earnings as t his may give investors a clearer picture of earnings performance that is independent of the companies' growth strategy. We thus expect that high growth firms are more likely to engage in pro forma reporting of earnings than other firms. 5 Similar to Tasker (1998) , we measure growth rates using the firm's sales growth over the comparable fiscal quarter from the prior year, as well as the firm's market-to-book ratio at the end of the fiscal quarter.
Leverage
Hodgson and Clarke (2000) find that when firms exceed their 'optimal' amount of leverage, investors perceive earnings to be less informative due to the increased probability of firm failure and increased likelihood of earnings management. High leverage firms may benefit from the disclosure of pro forma e arnings figures that highlight the effects of nonrecurring items on profitability. That is, if investors believe that poor earnings performance increases the probability of bankruptcy, but the poor earnings performance is due to unusual items, investors might revise their assessment if the presence of these unusual items is emphasized in the earnings announcement. We therefore expect that firms with high leverage are more likely to include pro forma net income in their earnings releases than other firms. We measure this variable using the firm's debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the fiscal quarter.
Earnings Variability
When earnings patterns exhibit a high degree of variability from one time period to the next, earnings for a particular period will be less informative than if earnings variability is low. In addition, Trueman and Titman (1988) provide theoretical support for the idea that smoother earnings result in an increased stock price, and Michelson et al. (2000) demonstrate empirically that firms that report smoother income streams have significantly higher returns that other firms. Firms with high earnings variability may benefit from the release of pro forma earnings numbers if these figures result in a smoother earnings pattern than GAAP earnings. We therefore expect that that firms with high earnings variability are more likely to include pro forma net income in their earnings releases than other firms. We measure earnings variability by estimating the firm's standard deviation of return on assets over the past eight fiscal quarters.
Special Items
Elliott and Hanna (1996) argue that unusual items may obscure the information contained in reported earnings numbers and show that unexpected earnings before writeoffs are more important than are unexpected operating earnings in explaining security returns. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) document that analyst tracking services are increasingly focused on definitions of earnings that exclude nonrecurring items and that stock prices act as if investors price these earnings number rather than the numbers reported under GAAP. We therefore expect that firms with a high proportion of special items are more likely to report pro forma earnings figures than other firms.
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In addition to predicting that firms with less informative GAAP earnings are more likely to report pro forma numbers, we also rely on prior research in the strategic disclosure literature to develop a second hypothesis. Schrand and Walther (2000) refer to disclosure decisions as "strategic" if including or omitting an item in an earnings release reflects an attempt to influence readers' perceptions of the event. As the outpouring of anecdotal evidence in the popular press indicates, pro forma reporting of income certainly qualifies as strategic under this particular definition. While Schrand and Walther (2000) focus their examination on selective disclosure of prior-period earnings components, arguing that managers are attempting to influence the benchmark that investors use in interpreting e arnings changes, we focus on the earnings number itself -managers strategically disclose a pro forma earnings figure in the hope that investors will use it instead of GAAP net income in evaluating the earnings news. We predict that this behavior is more likely to occur when an earnings benchmark has been missed. This is our second hypothesis:
Firms that have missed an earnings benchmark under GAAP are more likely to engage in pro forma reporting of earnings than other firms. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) show that avoiding both losses and earnings decreases are important goals for managers. As with H 1 , we again expect that firms reporting losses are more likely to include pro forma net income in their earnings releases. We also expect that firms reporting negative earnings surprises are more likely to make this disclosure decision. We define earnings surprise as the net income for the current quarter minus net income for the comparable quarter in the prior year.
Investor Response to Pro Forma Earnings
Prior empirical research on pro forma earnings shows that, on average, pro forma earnings have significant incremental explanatory power for returns beyond that contained in either GAAP operating earnings or GAAP net income (see Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Brown and Sivakumar 2001; and Bhattacharya et al. 2002) . We extend prior research on the investor response to pro forma earnings by examining whether the relative and incremental information content of pro forma earnings varies systematically with firm characteristics.
We first examine whether the usefulness of pro forma earnings to investors varies with GAAP earnings quality. On the one hand, a case may be made for a complementary relationship between the usefulness of GAAP net income and pro forma earnings: i.e., pro forma earnings have more information content than GAAP earnings when the quality of GAAP earnings is low. This type of relationship has parallels in prior literature. For example, Dechow (1994) finds that earnings is a superior measure of performance over operating cash flows when operating cash flows are predicted to be especially uninformative, such as when the measurement interval is short or the operating cycle of the firm is long. Similarly, in the value relevance literature, Barth et al. (1998) find that the book value of equity plays a relatively more important role in determining stock price than net income when net income is relatively uninformative, such as when the firm is financially distressed. On the other hand, low GAAP earnings quality may provide an environment conducive to opportunistic reporting behavior (see, e.g., Fan and Wong 2002) . If investors associate low GAAP earnings quality with self-serving behavior on the part of managers, then they may view pro forma earnings as u ninformative in this instance. We thus state our third hypothesis in null form:
H 3 : The relative and incremental information content of pro forma earnings over GAAP earnings does not vary systematically with GAAP earnings quality.
We also examine the role of strategic reporting considerations on the informativeness of pro forma earnings. Pro forma earnings may be viewed as relatively more useful to investors when strategic considerations are absent, or at least when they are not obviously apparent to investors. For example, if a firm misses an earnings benchmark and also releases pro forma earnings information, it is possible that investors will disregard that information because the disclosure may be viewed as an attempt to distract them from poor performance. Previous empirical findings support the notion that investors discount information they view as opportunistically motivated (see, e.g., Balsam et al. 2002 or Hutton et al. 2000 . Alternatively, Schrand and Walther (2000) report that investors use the s trategically-selected benchmarks provided by managers in quarterly earnings announcements, suggesting that pro forma earnings may have information content even in the presence of strategic reporting considerations. We thus state our fourth hypothesis in null form:
H 4 : The relative and incremental information content of pro forma earnings over GAAP earnings does not vary systematically with missing an earnings benchmark.
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION
We identify our initial sample of firms that report pro forma earnings information by performing a key word search of the wire service reports in the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database over 1997 through 1999. 7 We searched for press releases that contained the terms "pro forma earnings/net income/loss" or "adjusted e arnings/net income/loss." 8 As outlined in Table 1 , our initial search identified 5,287 press releases.
We excluded 1,098 sample firms whose use of the term "pro forma" refers solely to the retroactive effects of an initial public offering, merger, or acquisition (i.e., the "traditional" definition of "pro forma"). We further eliminated 555 firms who reported pro forma numbers based solely on a change in tax status. The majority of these firms were "S" corporations that became "C" corporations and thus became tax-paying entities for the first time. We also eliminated 988 foreign firms and public limited corporations (PLC's), 452 duplicate press releases (the press release with the earlier date is kept in the sample), 489 press releases that did not include an earnings announcement, and 209 firms whose pro forma adjustment related only to the number of weighted average shares outstanding.
Finally, another 586 firms were eliminated for other reasons, e.g., reporting of "pro forma" sales, cash flows, or other financial items, referring to EBITDA or operating earnings as "pro forma" earnings, changes in fiscal year or accounting methods, restatement of prior period results due to spinoffs or other divestitures, etc. The "other" category also includes firms that did not provide a definition of "pro forma." We eliminated these firms from the sample because, for the subset of firms that we checked, the pro forma earnings figure was identical to GAAP net income reported in the firm's 10-Q filing with the SEC.
This procedure yielded a total of 910 firms. Of these, 240 firms referred to pro forma net income from either a prior quarter in the current fiscal year or a comparable quarter in the prior fiscal year without providing pro forma figures for the current quarter.
Because our empirical analysis includes tests of the relative and incremental information content of pro forma earnings, which require data for the current period, these firms were also eliminated from the final sample. Lastly, 421 firms did not have all of the quarterly because we were interested in learning whether the frequency of such reporting had increased over time.
Our results indicate that it has -our final sample of 249 press releases include 43 in 1997, 87 in 1998, and 119 in 1999. 8 Our search did not include terms like "cash earnings" or "excluding certain GAAP expenses." This omission may contaminate our control sample; i.e., our matched control firms may be reporting cash earnings or excluding certain GAAP expenses in their press releases. However, this potential bias works against our finding any significant differences between the two samples.
Compustat and CRSP data necessary to complete our analysis. Thus, the final sample consists of 249 releases for 135 distinct firms.
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Table 2 provides descriptive data on the distribution of the sample firms by industry. We use 4 -digit SIC codes to place each firm into one of 48 industry classifications as defined by Fama and French (1997) . The most striking finding in Panel C is the preponderance of firms in "Business Services" -nearly one-third of the sample falls into this industry, which includes prepackaged software and computer-related services such as data processing and information retrieval services. where we predict that pro forma reporting of income is more likely for high-technology and intangible-intensive firms because GAAP earnings is relatively less informative for these industries. 9 The requirement of at least eight quarters of complete data to estimate firms' earnings-returns correlations (as in equation 1) biases the final sample toward larger firms. Without this requirement, the final sample consists of 479 releases with mean (median) total assets of $2,939 ($526) million; with this requirement, mean (median) total assets, as reported in Table 3 , are $4,209 ($891) million. 10 As a descriptive exercise, we classified each pro forma adjustment (a total of 469 individual adjustments from 249 releases) into one of 13 categories. The results (not tabulated) are similar to those reported in Bhattacharya et al. (2002) , in that exclusions of merger and acquisition costs, unspecified nonrecurring charges, restructuring charges, research and development costs, non-cash compensation costs, and amortization charges were the most common adjustments.
V. MAIN RESULTS
Determinants of Pro Forma Reporting of Income
In testing H 1 , we use a matched-sample design, where each firm that reports pro forma earnings is matched to a control firm that does not report pro forma earnings.
Given the above finding that pro forma reporting is concentrated in high-technology industries and the difficulty of controlling for industry in a multivariate analysis, we believe that matching on industry first is important. We therefore use 4-digit SIC codes to identify potential control firms for the same fiscal year and quarter as the sample pro forma firm. We then eliminate any potential matched firms whose total assets are less than 25% or greater than 200% of the sample firm's total assets and choose the closest match on size from the remaining firms.
11 If no 4-digit match exists, we proceed to 3-digit matches; if no 3-digit match exists, we proceed to 2-digit matches. We were able to identify 4-digit industry and size matches for 238 firms out of the total sample of 249; we used 3-digit matches for 9 firms and 2-digit matches for 2 firms.
In Table 3 , we present univariate tests of differences in firm characteristics between the pro forma firms and their matched control firms. We examine differences between total assets, intangible intensity, the earnings-return correlation (EQ1) and its related R 2 (EQ2), reported losses, market-to-book ratios, sales growth, debt-to-equity ratios, standard deviation of return on assets, special items, and earnings surprises.
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Total assets and intangible intensity are not significantly different across the two groups, indicating that our matching procedure has controlled successfully for these factors.
With the exception of the debt-to-equity ratio, the remaining firm characteristics are all significantly different in the direction predicted. firms with lower quality GAAP earnings are more likely to engage in pro forma reporting of income. We also find that firms reporting pro forma earnings are significantly more likely to report negative earnings surprises (51.4% versus 36.5%), which when combined with the findings for the frequency of losses supports H 2 ; i.e., firms that miss earnings benchmarks are more likely to provide pro forma earnings estimates than other firms.
In Table 4 , we perform multivariate probit analyses using the same set of independent variables. The dependent variable is coded one for our sample firms and zero for the matched controls for a total of 498 observations. In Models 1 through 3, we use the actual value of the EQ1 and EQ2 variables, and in Models 4 through 6 we replace the actual value of the EQ1 and EQ2 variables with their relative ranks among the 498
observations. The results are fairly consistent across all six model specifications. 14 We find that, as predicted, GAAP earnings quality as measured by EQ1 and EQ2 is negatively associated with the probability of releasing pro forma earnings information;
i.e., the lower the earnings quality, the more likely the release of pro forma information.
We also find that after controlling directly for GAAP earnings quality, pro forma firms have significantly higher sales growth and earnings variability and also are significantly more likely to report negative earnings surprises than their matched control counterparts.
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The Maddala (1983) p seudo-R 2 ranges from 71.4% to 71.7%, which suggests relatively high explanatory power. Overall, the results from Tables 3 and 4 support both H 1 and H 2 . 16 Pro forma reporting of income is significantly related to both the quality of GAAP earnings and to strategic considerations surrounding earnings benchmarks. 13 The negative sign results from the fact that special items are typically income-decreasing items. Kinney and Trezevant (1997) report mean negative special items for a large sample of Compustat firms. 14 We also obtain qualitatively similar results when we use relative ranks for all the independent variables rather than just for EQ1 and EQ2. 15 Although our matching procedure is based in part on firm size, we still include the log of total assets as a control variable to capture any residual effects of firm size on the response variable. This variable is at least marginally significant in each of the six specifications on Table 4 . 16 As a sensitivity test, we also perform a logit analysis of the pro forma reporting decision; the results are qualitatively unchanged from those reported.
Investor Response to Pro Forma Earnings: Relative and Incremental Information Content
To test whether pro forma earnings have greater relative information content than GAAP earnings, we perform t ests similar to those in Dechow (1994) and Biddle et al. (1995) in which we regress abnormal stock returns around the earnings release on the earnings measure in question, as follows:
where CAR it is the raw stock return minus the CRSP equal-weighted market portfolio return and ∆EARN it is the earnings surprise for firm i in period t.
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We measure abnormal returns over the two-day window (0,+1) where day 0 is the date of the press release.
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The earnings surprise is defined as the difference between the earnings measure in question (either pro forma or GAAP earnings) and the same measure from the comparable quarter from the prior year; i.e., we assume each earnings measure follows a random walk. 19 A finding that the R 2 from one regression is significantly greater (based on Vuongs's (1989) Z -statistics) than the R 2 from another regression constitutes evidence that the relative information content of one earnings measure is greater than that of another.
20
For our tests of incremental information content, we follow the standard methodology (see, e.g., Bowen et al. 1987 ) and regress abnormal returns on pro forma earnings and either GAAP or core earnings, as follows:
where CAR it is abnormal returns, as defined above, ∆NI it is seasonally-difference GAAP earnings, and ∆PF it is seasonally-differenced pro forma earnings. A finding that the 17 As a sensitivity test, we also use the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio return to calculate abnormal returns; the empirical results are virtually unchanged. 18 We compared press release dates with the quarterly earnings announcement dates provided on Compustat. In most cases, the two dates were identical, but in cases where there were differences, the press release date usually preceded the earnings announcement date by one day. 19 For GAAP earnings, we obtain this data from Compustat; for pro forma earnings, we obtain the prior year's pro forma earnings from the press release. The majority of firms provide a pro forma earnings figure for the previous year (231 out of 249). We use GAAP earnings from the prior year in the remaining 18 cases. 20 A similar approach is used by Dhaliwal et al. (1999) to test the relative information content of comprehensive income and by Moehrle et al. (2001) to test earnings before goodwill amortization. estimated coefficient on ∆PF it is significantly different from zero is evidence that pro forma earnings have incremental information content over GAAP earnings.
In Table 5 To test whether the relative and incremental information content of pro forma earnings varies systematically with GAAP earnings quality, we divide our sample into high and low earnings quality based on our EQ1 measure and repeat the tests from Table   5 on both groups. We define "high" GAAP earnings quality as an EQ1 measure above the median and "low" quality as below. 22 The results, presented in Panel A of Table 6, indicate that pro forma earnings have significantly greater relative information content over GAAP earnings for the group of firms with low earnings quality. As shown in the right-hand column, the adjusted R 2 for GAAP earnings is 1.66% versus 3.85% for pro forma earnings for this group; as indicated by the Vuong Z -statistic of -3.43, this difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. There is also evidence that pro forma earnings have incremental information content for this group of firms, as indicated by the significantly positive estimated coefficient of 0.6223 on ∆PF in Model 3. For the firms with high GAAP earnings quality, GAAP net income has greater relative 21 In fact, pro forma earnings exceed GAAP net income for 85.8% of our sample. 22 As a sensitivity test, we also use EQ2 as a partitioning variable. Results are qualitatively similar to those using EQ1; however, the significance levels are slightly increased.
information content than pro forma earnings, as indicated by the adjusted R 2 of 3.30% for net income versus 0.75% for pro forma earnings (p-value < 0.01). There is also no evidence of incremental information content of pro forma earnings for this group. We therefore reject H 3 and conclude that the information content of pro forma earnings varies systemically with GAAP earnings quality.
In Table 6 and conclude that the information content of pro forma earnings varies systematically with strategic reporting considerations.
In Table 6 , Panel C, we perform an additional set of tests. We create four groups of firms based on GAAP earnings quality and the direction of the earnings surprise:
high/low quality × positive/negative surprise. Given that both null hypotheses H 3 and H 4 23 Results are invariant to whether we partition on the direction of the surprise itself or on whether the pro forma earnings figure allows the firm to avoid reporting an earnings decline. As the former designation applies to a larger proportion of the total sample (128 cases where the earnings surprise is negative versus 74 cases where the earnings surprise is negative and pro forma earnings are positive), we chose the former designation. 24 Another possible partition is profits versus losses. However, given that losses were not a significant determinant of pro forma reporting in the multivariate probit analyses, we partition by the earnings surprise variable alone, which was statistically significant in Table 4. were rejected, the relative and incremental information content of pro forma earnings should be most pronounced for firms that have both low GAAP earnings quality and a positive earnings surprise. Similarly, pro forma earnings should be least useful to investors when GAAP earnings quality is high and the earnings surprise is negative. Tests of relative and incremental information content are repeated for these two groups. As shown in the right-hand column, as predicted, pro forma earnings have greater relative information content than GAAP earnings for former group, with an adjusted R 2 of 9.04%
for pro forma earnings versus 2.27% for GAAP earnings (Z = -6.07, p-value < 0.01). The estimated coefficient of 1.0629 on ∆PF in Model 3 is also statistically significant at the 0.0228 level. In the left-hand column, where we examine firms with high GAAP earnings quality and negative earnings surprises, GAAP earnings have significantly greater relative information content, and pro forma earnings do not have incremental information content.
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VI. ADDITIONAL TESTS
As noted in prior literature (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Healy and Palepu 1993) , managerial discretion may improve the information environment by allowing communication of private information. On the other hand, managers may also use their discretion opportunistically to mislead investors. Overall, our results from Table 6 suggest that investors view the release of pro forma earnings as enhancing the information environment when GAAP earnings quality is low and as possibly opportunistically motivated when an earnings benchmark is missed. However, it is possible that investors are not reacting "rationally" to pro forma earnings information.
For example, they could act as if the pro forma earnings figure has information content when it does not; conversely, they could ignore the pro forma earnings figure when it actually conveys new information.
We therefore include an additional set of tests examining the ability of pro forma earnings in predicting future operating performance and returns. If the pro forma earnings number provides significant explanatory power for future profitability in cases when it also has greater relative and significant incremental explanatory power over other earnings measures, the evidence is consistent with market efficiency; if it does not, the results are consistent with mispricing. Opposite conclusions may be drawn in cases where the pro forma earnings number did not have greater relative or incremental information content. For example, if the pro forma earnings number is not priced when it is announced but has predictive ability for future profitability, this is evidence of mispricing. If, on the other hand, it has no predictive ability and is not priced, this is consistent with market efficiency.
Our tests are similar to those in Subramanyam (1996) . We use three different measures of one-year-ahead future profitability -GAAP net income, pro forma earnings, and, because year-ahead pro forma earnings are only available for slightly more than half of our sample, "core" earnings, which we defined as GAAP net income minus special items --and regress each on current year GAAP income, pro forma earnings, and core earnings, collectively. We include all three measures as independent variables because all three are available at the time of the press release and because we are interested in examining the ability of pro forma earnings to predict future performance after controlling for the effects of the other two earnings measures.
We also examine the ability of pro forma numbers to predict future returns. We measure year-ahead returns from two days after the current earnings announcement through the announcement date of year-ahead earnings (i.e., earnings for the comparable quarter of the following year). Consistent with Doyle et al. (2002) , we use the pro forma exclusions from GAAP net income as our independent variable.
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The results are presented in Table 7 . In Panel A, we present results for the full sample of 249 press releases. Pro forma earnings do n ot, on average, have predictive power for future GAAP or "core" earnings or for future returns, as evidenced by the insignificant α 2 coefficients for these variables. It does, however, have predictive power for future pro forma earnings for the smaller group of 146 press releases for which future pro forma earnings estimates are available.
As in Table 6 , we divide Panel B of Table 7 into two groups based on relative GAAP earnings quality. The α 2 coefficients in the right-hand column are at least marginally significant, and the α 4 coefficient in the future returns regression is also marginally significant, indicating that pro forma earnings have significant predictive ability for future operating performance and returns when GAAP earnings quality is low.
When GAAP earnings quality is high, pro forma earnings do not, in general, have predictive power for future operating performance or returns, as shown in the left-hand column of Panel B. In fact, the only instance in which it does have predictive ability is for future "core" earnings, but in that case it is negatively correlated with future performance (α 2 = -0.1473, p -value = 0.0439). Because pro forma earnings have significant information content in the former case and none in the latter, overall these results are consistent with market efficiency.
Consistent with Table 6 , in Panel C of Table 7 Furthermore, the p -value for the α 4 coefficient is 0.0203, indicating that pro forma earnings also have significant predictive power for returns for the group of firms. When earnings quality is high and the earnings surprise is negative, as in the left-hand column, we find that the pro f orma earnings figure is negatively correlated with future GAAP earnings (α 2 = -0.1875, p-value = 0.0792), future "core" earnings (α 2 = -0.3425, p-value = 0.0010), and future returns (α 4 = -6.6076, p-value = 0.0774). Overall, these results are consistent with market efficiency; however, it may be argued in the latter case that complete market efficiency would require that pro forma earnings also be negatively correlated with announcement returns in Table 6 .
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides evidence on the characteristics of firms that include pro forma earnings information in their press releases, whether this information is perceived as useful to investors, and whether this perception is "rational." We find that firms with low GAAP earnings quality, as measured by the earnings-return correlation and its related R 2 , are more likely to disclose pro forma earnings than other firms. In addition, firms that engage in pro forma reporting of income are concentrated in high-technology industries, and have greater sales growth, and greater earnings variability. Furthermore, firms with negative earnings surprises are more likely than other firms to include pro forma earnings in their press releases, which is consistent with findings in the strategic disclosure literature.
We also find that the relative and incremental information content of pro forma earnings varies systematically with both GAAP earnings quality measures and with strategic considerations as measured by the direction of the GAAP earnings surprise.
Specifically, we find that pro forma earnings are most useful to investors when GAAP earnings quality is low and strategic considerations are absent. We also find that pro forma earnings have significant predictive ability for future operating performance and returns in this instance.
This study has several limitations. While ideally the examination of the determinants of the pro forma reporting decision would allow us to gain some insight regarding managers' motivations behind the disclosures, we acknowledge that we cannot, on an ex ante basis, distinguish between a desire to inform versus a desire to obfuscate because manager motivations are unobservable. In addition, an empirically documented association between pro forma earnings releases and low GAAP earnings quality, for example, may easily be interpreted as consistent with either motivation.
In making any inferences regarding the underlying motivation of managers, we therefore rely on the ex post ability of pro forma earnings in predicting future operating performance and/or returns. If pro forma earnings predict future performance and returns, it is consistent with the idea that managers provided the numbers in order to improve communications. However, we still cannot rule out the possibility that some obfuscation is taking place. As the recent spate of accounting scandals demonstrates, obfuscation may continue for years without being detected, and thus one might argue that you can never look far enough ahead to be certain that communication is truly informative. Similarly, if pro forma earnings do not have predictive power, it is more likely that the numbers were released in order to distract investors from GAAP performance -however, we cannot rule out an "intent" to inform that, for whatever reason, was unsuccessful, or a lack of statistical power on the part of the researcher. Thus, while our results are consistent with the idea that firms with low quality GAAP earnings and positive earnings surprises appear to have an informativeness motivation, and firms with high quality GAAP earnings and negative surprises may be attempting to obfuscating performance, these conclusions are subject to the limitations discussed above.
Our implementation of strategic reporting considerations is an a dditional limitation of the study. In the interest of simplicity, we proxy for strategic considerations using a single variable -the direction of the earning surprise. However, other strategic considerations may also play a role in the informativeness of pro forma earnings to investors, and while their inclusion may complicate both the analysis and its possible interpretations, future research might examine additional strategic reporting motives on the part of managers.
We also treat all pro forma earnings information as essentially homogeneous, though we know from anecdotal evidence as well as from empirically documented work (see, e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2002) that the nature of pro forma adjustments varies considerably from firm to firm. Our main research questions focused on which firm characteristics were significant determinants of pro forma reporting and on whether these characteristics were associated with differences in the usefulness of pro forma earnings to investors. A more focused analysis examining the determinants of the type of pro forma adjustments may be an interesting extension to the current work.
Lastly, our reliance on the earnings-return correlation as a measure of earnings quality biases our final sample towards relatively larger firms. Future work might be directed at determining whether our inferences generalize to samples of smaller firms. Individual industries are as defined by Fama and French (1997) . "Other" industries include: Alcoholic Beverages; Aircraft; Tobacco Products; Miscellaneous; Textiles; Agriculture; Candy and Soda; Coal; Construction; Consumer Goods; Defense; Nonmetallic Mining; Precious Metals; Real Estate; Shipbuilding &Railroad; Shipping; and Containers. High-technology firms are as defined by Francis and Schipper (1999) . Intangible-intensive firms are as defined by Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997) . We selected control firms by matching on 4-digit industry codes and firm size, as measured by total assets. If a 4-digit match was unavailable, a 3-digit matched was used; if a 3-digit match was unavailable, a 2-digit match was used. INTANGIBLE ASSETS is total intangibles divided by total assets. EQ1 is the estimated coefficient from the regression AR = b 0 + b 1 ∆EARN + ε, where AR is the quarterly market-adjusted return and ∆EARN is seasonally-differenced quarterly earnings divided by market capitalization; EQ2 is the R 2 from the same regression. LOSS equals 1 if quarterly earnings are negative and zero otherwise. MARKET-TO-BOOK is stock price per share divided by common equity per share. SALES GROWTH is current quarterly sales divided by quarterly sales from four quarters prior minus one. DEBT-TO-EQUITY is total liabilities divided by total common equity. StdROA is the standard deviation of return on assets over the previous eight quarters. SPECIAL ITEMS is special items divided by total assets. NEGSURP equals 1 ∆EARN is negative and zero otherwise. All variables are measured at the end of the fiscal quarter with the exception of intangible assets, which is measured as of the end of the fiscal year. P-values for means are based on two-tailed t-tests; p-values for medians are based on two-tailed Wilcoxon tests. 71.4% N = 498. PF is coded one if the sample firm released a pro forma disclosure in a press release over the period 1997-99, and zero for each matched control firm. LNASSET is the log of total assets. All other variables are defined on 5.59*** -6.07*** N = 249. CAR is cumulative abnormal stock returns, defined as raw returns minus the CRSP equalweighted market portfolio, measured over the two-day window (0,+1), where 0 is the date of the press release. ∆NI is seasonally-differenced quarterly earnings divided by market capitalization at the end of the fiscal quarter. ∆PF is seasonally-differenced pro forma quarterly earnings divided by market capitalization. EQ1 is the estimated coefficient from the regression AR = b 0 + b 1 ∆EARN + ε, where AR is the quarterly market-adjusted return and ∆EARN is seasonally-differenced quarterly earnings divided by market capitalization. P-values in Panel B are presented in parentheses. Vuong's Z-statistic tests whether the adjusted R 2 is significantly greater for Model 1 versus Model 2. Return t+1 is the year-ahead market-adjusted return, measured from two days after the pro forma earnings announcement through the announcement date of the following year's earnings for the comparable quarter. CORENI t+1 is net income minus special items for the comparable quarter of the following year. All other variables are defined on Table 5 . P-values are presented in parentheses.
